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IN Nil III \I1CUURI OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
RAYMOND FLORES SILVAZ : Case No. 20020298-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE
 P R O C I i : E D i N GS 
1 hh is nil appeal from n pidgment of conviction for enticing a minor over the 
Internet, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-4-401 
(Supp. 2002), assault against a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor in violation of I Itah 
Code Annotated section 76-5-102.4 (1999), and filial* imp with ,i pvm v ntluvr, a class A 
misdemeanor in violation ol I Mali < mtv Annotated section 76-8-305 (1999). Utah Code 
\iiiiufaffci sa lion 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002) authorizes this Court to entertain appeals 
from cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The definition of the crime of enticing a minor over the Internet ("Internet 
enticement statute") requires the State to prove that a person has not committed an 
attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation crime but at the same time has solicited, seduced, 
lured, or enticed a minor to engage in prohibited sexual acts or has attempted to entice a 
minor to do so. Is this statute vague and/or internally inconsistent since it requires the 
State to prove both the nonexistence of an attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation and also 
that the defendant solicited or attempted to solicit a minor? 
This Court reviews the interpretation of a statute for correctness. State v. Cox. 
826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Trial counsel preserved this issue by 
requesting the trial judge to dismiss the charge because the Internet enticement statute 
was internally inconsistent. R. 212: 97-98.! 
2. The Internet enticement statute requires the State to prove both the existence 
and the nonexistence of a solicitation or an attempt. Given this contradictory language, 
does that statute provide persons of ordinary intelligence notice of prohibited conduct? 
The question of whether a statute is vague presents a legal question which this 
Court reviews for correctness. Provo City v. Thompson, 2002 UT App 63, f 10, 44 P.3d 
828. Defense counsel argued that the Internet enticement statute was "fatally flawed" 
because it is contradictory. R. 212: 98. In any event, the trial judge should have 
invalidated the statute under the plain error doctrine. 
3. Could a reasonable jury have found Appellant Raymond Flores Silvaz guilty 
*The transcript marked "212" contains the trial transcript. The internal page 
numbers of that volume will be referred to as "R. 212" followed by the page number. 
2 
beyond a reasonable doubt given the contradictory language of the Internet enticement 
statute? In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court affords great deference to 
the jury verdict and will only reverse a conviction when reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Goddard, 
871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Defense counsel requested the trial judge to dismiss the 
enticement charge based on the conflicting terms of the Internet enticement statute and 
the lack of evidence. R. 212: 97-98. 
4. Prosecutors may only comment on a defendant's failure to call witnesses when 
the prosecutor obtains advance permission from the trial court and the witnesses are 
equally available to both parties. The prosecutor here argued in closing statements that 
Mr. Silvaz's testimony was false because he failed to call as witnesses the people he was 
communicating with in an Internet chat room and whom could have supported that he 
lacked criminal intent. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by commenting on Mr. 
Silvaz's failure to present witnesses? 
This Court must review prosecutors' remarks to determine whether they called to 
the jury's attention improper matters and whether the erroneous comments probably 
influenced the jury's verdict. State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400. 402 (Utah 19861 The 
trial court plainly erred by failing to strike the prosecutor's inflammatory remarks. State 
v. HelmicL 2000 UT 70,^9, 9 P.3d 164. 
3 
STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-4-401 (Supp. 2002) defines the crime of enticing 
a minor over the Internet: 
(1) A person commits enticement of a minor over the 
Internet when, not amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or 
solicitation under Section 76-4-101,76-4-201, or 76-4-203, the 
person knowingly uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or 
entice, or attempt to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a 
person the defendant believes to be a minor to engage in any 
sexual activity which is a violation of state criminal law. 
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of enticing a minor 
under Subsection (1), or an attempt to commit this offense, that 
a law enforcement officer or an undercover operative who is 
working with a law enforcement agency was involved in the 
detection or investigation of the offense. 
(3) An enticement of a minor under Subsection (1) with 
the intent to commit: 
(a) a first degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(b) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; 
(c) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor; 
(d) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; and 
(e) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 5, 2001, the State charged Mr. Silvaz with enticing a minor over the 
Internet, possessing a controlled substance, assaulting a peace officer, and interfering with 
a peace officer. R. 1. Mr. Silvaz waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the trial 
court bound the case over for trial. R. 35-36. At some unknown point, the trial court 
dropped the drug possession count. The trial court conducted a jury trial on November 
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29, 2001, and the jury convicted Mr. Silvaz of all three charges. R. 159; 212: 168. 
On April 2, 2002, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Silvaz to a term of one to 15 years 
in the state prison but suspended the term and ordered Mr. Silvaz to serve one year in jail 
with the possibility of early release into an in-patient program. R. 195; Addendum A. 
For the assault charge, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Silvaz to one year in jail but 
suspended the sentence. R. 195-96. He likewise imposed a sentence of six months in jail 
for interfering with police and suspended the sentence. R. 195-96. The trial judge further 
placed Mr. Silvaz on probation for 36 months and ordered the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole to evaluate Mr. Silvaz's counseling needs. R. 196-97. Mr. Silvaz 
filed a timely notice of appeal on April 11,2002. R. 198. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 24, 2001, Rhett McQuiston, an investigator with the Internet Crimes 
Against Children Task Force ('Task Force"), was posing as a 13-year old boy on the 
Internet. R. 212: 25-31. Officer McQuiston pretended he was E. J. Birch, a junior high 
school student in Murray, Utah. R. 32. In actuality, he was using a computer in a 
downtown Salt Lake City law enforcement building. R. 212: 60. 
Officer McQuiston created a user profile listing E. J.'s hobbies and interests and 
established the user name of E.J.Bizkit after a popular music group. R. 212: 31. Officer 
McQuiston entered an Internet Service Provider chat room called ,fM4MUtahM which 
5 
caters to homosexual men in Utah. R. 212: 31. A chat room is a computer program that 
allows Internet users with similar interests to either send instant messages directly to a 
specific person or to converse with several users simultaneously. R. 212: 26-27, 32. 
While posing as E. J., Officer McQuiston received an instant message from a user 
named "Monneblue." R. 212: 32. The following exchange took place with Officer 
McQuiston's subsequent explanations of slang terms and Internet abbreviations in 
brackets (misspellings and typographical errors were included in the original dialogue): 
Monneblue: HIGH 
EJBizkit: hey u 
Monneblue: HOW GOES IT 
EJBizkit: good and u 
Monneblue: HOW OLD R YOU? 
Monneblue: GREAT THANKS 
EJBizkit: how old r u and why r u yelling at me [capital letters 
may signify yelling when chatting on the Internet or 
conversing in e-mail]. 
Monneblue: NOT 
EJBizkit: i am 13 from murray and will be 14 in July 
EJBizkit: asl [request for age, sex, and location]. 
Monneblue: WHAT EVER 
Monneblue: K 
Monneblue: THANKS 
EJBIZKIT: so wsup 
Monneblue: JUST HORNY 
EJBizkit: lol [laughing out loud] 
Monneblue: BIG AND ROCK HARD 
Monneblue: AND YOU? 
EJBizkit: yea kind of 
Monneblue: HOW BIG R U? 
EJBizkit: 5'5 135 pounds brown hair and eyes u 
Monneblue: LQQK AT MY PROFILE 
Monneblue: YOU HAVE A PIC [requesting a picture] 
EJBizkit: only my year book ones and i got rid of themi look 
stupid 
Monneblue: NO NEW ONES 
Monneblue: WHOM DO YOU LIVE WITH? 
EJBizkit: my mom 
Monneblue: YOU NEAR DOWN TOWN 
EJBizkit: who do you u live with 
Monneblue: BROTHER 
EJBizkit: i live in murray where do you liv 
Monneblue: ROY 
EJBizkit: kewl [cool] its just me and mom 
Monneblue: HOW FAR IS MURRAY 
EJBizkit: roy is brother 
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Monneblue: NO I LIVE rN ROY WITH MY BROTHER 
EJBizkit: oh kewl where is roy 
Monneblue: WHERE IS MURRAY 
Monneblue: ROY IS BY OGDEN 
EJBizkit: kewl 
EJBizkit: do u know wher murray is 
Monneblue: NOPE 
Monneblue: WHERE 
EJBizkit: its by salt lake 
EJBizkit: on the other side 
Monneblue: HOW FAR 
Monneblue: DO YOU DRIVE 
Monneblue: HELLO [indicating possible interruption in 
communications] 
EJBizkit: i cant get my licenc until i turn 16 
EJBizkit: i walk everywhere 
Monneblue: HOW FAR IS MURRAY FROM DOWN 
TOWN SLC 
EJBizbit: maybe 15 minutes if u drive a lot longer if u walk 
Monneblue: WELL I WILL BE IN SLC TO NIGHT? 
EJBizkit: kewl where at 
Monneblue: IF YOU WANT TO MEET ME 
Monneblue: BY SHILO 




Monneblue: AND ALL 
Monneblue: DO YOU DRINK 
EJBizkit: kewl 
Monneblue: OR SMOKE 
EJBizkit: i drink 
Monneblue: YOU DO YOU SMOKE BUD [marijuana] 
EJBizkit: a couple of times 
Monneblue: I HAVE SOME 
Monneblue: DO YOU WANA MEET 
EJBizkit: yeah that would be kewl 
EJBizkit: what should we do 
Monneblue: WHAT IS YOUR NUMBER SO I CALL YOU 
WHEN I GET THERE 
EJBizkit: ah my mom is home she will kill me if u call 
Monneblue: ME ANTHONY 
Monneblue: SO HOW R WE GOING TO MEET 
EJBizkit: im ej do u know where my school is it is riverview 
jrhigh 
Monneblue: NEAR WHERE 
EJBizkit: im in the 8th grade 
Monneblue: THATS FINE 
Monneblue: WILL YOU BE ABLE TO CUM OUT 
[ejaculate] 
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EJBizkit: kewl i live by my school and overview jr. high is on 
7thwest and 5900 south in murray 
EJBizkit: sounds fun what do u want to do 
Monneblue: DRINK 
Monneblue: AND SUCK EACHOTHER 
EJBizkit: kewl sounds fun 
EJBizkit: r u sure u will meet me or be a shine [no show] 
Monneblue: WHAT IS YOUR NAME 
Monneblue: I WANT TO MEET YOU 
EJBizkit: ej 
Monneblue: HOW BIG R YOUR FEET 
EJBizkit: 8 
Monneblue: NICE 
Monneblue: AND YOUR COCK 
EJBizkit: my nikes r 
EJBizkit: i dont no 
EJBizkit: kinda big i guess r u 
Monneblue: IS IT SAMLL? 
Monneblue: 7.5 
EJBizkit: in the middle i guess 
Monneblue: NICE 
Monneblue: YOU LIKE TO SUCK 
EJBizkit: like ur dick 
Monneblue: YUP 
Monneblue: DO YOU 
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EJBizkit: yeah do you 
Monneblue: COOL 
Monneblue: WHAT ELSE 
EJBizkit: ive done some stuff 
EJBizkit: what do u want to do 
Monneblue: LIKE WHAT 
Monneblue: SUCK AND FUCK 
Monneblue: YOU LIKE TO FUCK 
EJBizkit: yeah 
EJBizkit: do u 
Monneblue: YUP 
Monneblue: HOW ABOUT DO YOU FUCK ASS 
EJBizkit: once do u 
Monneblue: YUP 
Monneblue: AND I LIKE TO GET FUCKED TOO 
EJBizkit: kewl 
EJBizkit: u seem cute 
Monneblue: DO YOU LIKE THAT 
Monneblue: THANKS 
Monneblue: SO DO YOU 
Monneblue: WELL I GOT TO GET READY 
Monneblue: CALL ME 
EJBizkit: kewl when should we meet and where we can at my 
school 
EJBizkit: or the gas station by it 
Monneblue: K 
Monneblue: 725-2455 
Monneblue: IS MY CELL 
11 
EJBizkit: kewl who do i ask for 
Monneblue: SO CALL ME AFTER 8:30 
Monneblue: ANTHONY 
EJBizkit: kewl call after 830 
Monneblue: K 
Monneblue: HOW FAR FROM SHILO DO YOU LIVE 
EJBizkit: r u for real i don't want to get ready 
EJBizkit: and have u not show 
Monneblue: IM FOR REAL AND I WILL SHOW 
Monneblue: IM ASKING HOW FAR FROM SHILO DO 
YOU LIVE 
EJBizkit: where should we meet at the gas station by my 
school riverview jr high 




Monneblue: HOW FAR DO YOU LIVE FROM THERE 
EJBizkit: murray is about a 15 drivehey u [possible 
interruption in communications] 
EJBizkit: from salt lake city 
Monneblue: SO YOU NOT NEAR DOWN TOWN 
Monneblue: I NEVER BEEN TO MURRAY 
EJBizkit: yeah i am its just about 15 minutes is all 
EJBizkit: is that a problem 




Monneblue: THAT IS GREAT 
Monneblue: AND WE WILL RENT A ROOM 
EJBizkit: i think it is 
Monneblue: AND WE WILL HAVE FUN 
Monneblue: GOT TO GET READY K 
EJBizkit: kewl i have to be home by 11 because it is a school 
night 
Monneblue: K 
Monneblue: IF YOU NEED MONEY I WILL GIVE YOU 
SOME 
Monneblue: K 
EJBizkit: so what should we do meet at my school or 
somewhere else 
EJBizkit: hey u 
Monneblue: MEET DOWN TOWN 
Monneblue: I DON'T KNOW WHERE MURRAY IS 
EJBizkit: kewl i can take trax downtown 
Monneblue: I GOT TO GET READY 
Monneblue: K 
EJBizkit: where should we meet 
Monneblue: MAKE SURE TO TAKE MY NUMBER 
Monneblue: SHILO 
Monneblue: K 
Monneblue: I GOT TO GET READY 
EJBizkit: where is the shilo 
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Monneblue: BY THE SALT PALACE 
EJBizkit: k i will call and we wil meet should i take trax now 
down town o r when 
Monneblue: IT HAS RED LIGHTS 
Monneblue: I WILL BE LEAVING AT 8:30 
EJBizkit: when should i be there 
Monneblue: BE THERE AT 940 
EJBizkit: k at the shilo 
Monneblue: YES 
Monneblue: TAKE MY NUMBER 
EJBizkit: u want me there at the shilo in its a hotel by the salt 
palace right 
EJBizkit: k give it to me again 
Monneblue: I WILL HAVE MY PHONE 
Monneblue: YUP 
Monneblue: 725-2455 
EJBizkit: kewl what do you look like 
Monneblue: GOT TO GO 
EJBizkit: so i know who u r and stuff 
Monneblue: SEE MY PRO FILE 
EJBizkit: k so ur for real it's a long way ofr me to go if you 
shine 
Monneblue: AND I WILL HAVE A BLACK JAKET 
Monneblue: I WILL BE THERE 
Monneblue: I PROMISE 
14 
EJBizkit: kewl 
EJBizkit: me to it will be fun 
Monneblue: BE WEARING BLUE JEANS 
EJBizkit: i will call first 
Monneblue: AND BLACK SHIRT 
Monneblue: AND BLACK JACKET 
EJBizkit: i should wear blue jeans or u will be 
Monneblue: K 
EJBizkit: so kewl 
Monneblue: K BYE 
Monneblue: LEAVING TO GET READY 
EJBizkit: i will call when i get down town so be there k 
EJBizkit: by 
Monneblue: K REMEMBER BE THER AT 940 
Monneblue: BI 
EJBizkit: k cya there 
Monneblue: ;-) [symbol for a smiley face] 
R. 212: 37-48; Exhibit 1; Addendum B. 
Following this conversation, Officer McQuiston used a computer program to print 
the entire conversation. R. 212: 34-35. The members of the Task Force then planned to 
establish surveillance around the front entrance of the Shilo Inn in Salt Lake City. R. 
212: 49. To confirm that the person known as Monneblue was planning to meet E. J, a 
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police officer, posing as E. J., telephoned Monneblue's cell phone and confirmed the 
meeting. R. 212: 62. 
Several task force members joined in the surveillance. Officer McQuiston sat on a 
bench at a bus stop in front of the Shilo Inn. R. 212: 50. Salt Lake City Police Detective 
Ryan Atack stood on the comer of West Temple Street and 200 South, 40 or 50 feet away 
from the bus stop. R. 212: 84. Meanwhile, a special agent for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations served as a decoy for E. J. R. 212: 49. All three law enforcement officers 
were in plain clothes. R. 212: 76. Several other plain clothes officers were placed in 
unmarked police cars as back-up help. R. 212: 49-50, 77. 
At about 10:00 p.m., a bus stopped in front of the Shilo Inn which Mr. Silvaz 
exited. R. 212: 50. Mr. Silvaz generally matched the description of Monneblue; 
specifically, he wore a black jacket, a black shirt, and blue jeans. R. 212: 50. Mr. Silvaz 
walked to the wall of the Shilo Inn and stood against it. R. 212: 51. 
Over the span of approximately four minutes, on three occasions, Mr. Silvaz 
walked up behind the special agent serving as the decoy, looked at him, and then returned 
to the place where he was standing. R. 212: 51. Mr. Silvaz then proceeded to make a call 
on his cell phone as he walked down 200 South. R. 212: 86. Upon seeing Mr. Silvaz 
departing, Det. Atack followed Mr. Silvaz and gave the arrest signal to the other officers. 
R. 212:51. 
Det. Atack placed his hand on Mr. Silvaz's shoulder, identified himself as a police 
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officer, informed Mr. Silvaz that he was under arrest, and ordered him to place his hands 
on his head. R. 212: 87. Mr. Silvaz began to raise his hands but then dropped his left arm 
to his waist. R. 212: 87. Concerned for his safety, Det. Atack repeated that he was a 
police officer and commanded Mr. Silvaz to place his hands on his head. R. 212: 87. Mr. 
Silvaz then turned around and faced Det. Atack with his left hand remaining at his side. 
R. 212: 86-87. Det. Atack responded by forcibly restraining Mr. Silvaz. R. 212: 88-90. 
About this time, Officer McQuiston approached and observed Det. Atack 
announcing that Mr. Silvaz was under arrest and pinning Mr. Silvaz against the wall. R. 
212: 52. Officer McQuiston announced several times that he was a police officer and that 
Mr. Silvaz was under arrest, but, Mr. Silvaz resisted and tried to free himself. R. 212: 52, 
54. Det. Atack tried to place handcuffs on Mr. Silvaz but Mr. Silvaz temporarily freed 
himself by pushing against the wall. R. 212: 53. Officer McQuiston then interceded and 
tried to place his knee behind Mr. Silvaz but his knee slipped and he lost leverage, 
allowing Mr. Silvaz to turn around. R. 212: 53. Mr. Silvaz looked at Officer McQuiston 
and then struck him in the chest with an elbow. R. 212: 53-54. 
During this scuffle, the back-up officers were arriving in their unmarked police 
cars with sirens blaring and lights on their cars' front grills flashing. R. 212: 54, 77. 
Despite the presence of several police officers, Mr. Silvaz yelled an obscenity and was 
finally subdued. R. 212: 55. The police searched Mr. Silvaz and found a green, leafy 
substance and $105 in cash. R. 212: 57, 90. They also found a post-it note with E. J.'s 
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name, Internet user name, and school address written on it. R. 212: 57-58. The police 
also dialed the cell phone number Monneblue had given to E. J. and confirmed that the 
number belonged to the cell phone in Mr. Silvaz's possession. R. 212: 62-63. 
The police arrested Mr. Silvaz and charged him with enticing a minor over the 
Internet, possession of a controlled substance, assaulting a peace officer, and interfering 
with a lawful arrest. R. 1. At some unknown point, the drug possession charge was 
dismissed and the prosecution continued on the remaining three charges. 
At a jury trial, Mr. Silvaz testified that he believed that he was conversing with an 
adult and that his friends were playing a joke on him. R. 212: 108. Specifically, Mr. 
Silvaz explained that he had been chatting online with several friends who were planning 
to meet at a club later that night. R. 212: 105-06. The club was located a block or so 
from the Shilo Inn. R. 212: 105-06. Mr. Silvaz's friends invited him to join them. R. 
212: 106. Mr. Silvaz informed his online friends that he did not want to go out because 
he had recently quit drinking. R. 212: 105-06. 
Upon hearing this excuse, Mr. Silva's friends sent mocking messages to him about 
being too old and unwilling to meet new people. R. 212: 107. The friends encouraged 
Mr. Silvaz to contact someone in the chat room and see if he could meet someone new at 
the club. R. 212: 107. Mr. Silvaz agreed and contacted EJBizkit. R. 212: 107. When E. 
J. indicated that he was 13 years old, Mr. Silvaz responded "whatever1' and believed that 
one of his friends was joking with him. R. 212: 108; Addendum B at 1. As he 
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communicated with E. J., Mr. Silvaz relayed the responses to his friends online. R.212: 
108. The friends then instructed him to send various explicit statements to E. J.. R. 212: 
108, 116. 
Mr. Silvaz testified that he had no intention of meeting a 13-year old boy at the 
Shilo Inn. Rather, he claimed that he planned to go to the club and see if E. J., whom he 
believed was an adult, was there. R. 212: 113. While he walked to the club, Det. Atack 
grabbed him from behind. R. 114-15. Because he did not hear any announcements about 
the police or an arrest, Mr. Silvaz thought he was being beaten up or mugged. R. 212: 
114-15. He claimed that he vigorously resisted out of fear for his safety and that he 
continued to resist when he saw that the men surrounding him were in plain clothes. R. 
212: 115. He claimed further that he heard no sirens and saw no lights. R. 212: 125. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Mr. Silvaz, "Where are these friends" 
with whom Mr. Silvaz claimed to be conversing online. R. 212: 120. Mr. Silvaz stated 
that he had telephoned one of them prior to trial but the number had been changed. R. 
212: 120. The prosecutor then asked Mr. Silvaz, "What are their names?" R. 212: 120. 
Mr. Silvaz refused to identify them. R. 212: 120. In response, the prosecutor derisively 
described the friends as "these friends with no names [who] told you what to say." R. 
212: 120. On redirect, Mr. Silvaz testified that he did not reveal his friends' identities 
because they did not want to be publicly exposed as communicating in a gay chat room. 
R. 212: 126. 
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During closing arguments, the prosecutor described the conversation with E. J. as 
direct evidence of Mr. Silvaz's intent. R. 212: 154. The prosecutor argued that, in 
contrast to the online chat, Mr. Silvaz's claims failed to support that he was joking with 
his online friends: 
What we don't have evidence of is these friends who told him 
what to say. That's convenient. We don't know who these 
friends are, we don't know what they hounded him to say. 
That's all convenient. That's exactly what probably should be 
said, [,f]I don't think it was a kid, I didn't think I was going to 
actually do anything. That's not what's important.["] 
R. 212: 154. The prosecutor summarized his argument by urging the jury to "use the 
evidence that is there, not the convenient stuff that is not there." R. 212: 157. 
The jury convicted Mr. Silvaz on all three charges. R. 159; 212: 168. The trial 
judge sentenced Mr. Silvaz to serve a year in jail for all three convictions and indicated 
that Mr. Silvaz could be released sooner if he secured an in-patient treatment program. R. 
195-96. The judge also placed Mr. Silvaz on probation for 36 months and ordered APP to 
evaluate Mr. Silvaz's treatment needs. R. 196-97. This appeal followed. R. 198. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously convicted Mr. Silvaz under the Internet enticement 
statute because that provision is contradictory and, therefore, fails to state a crime. That 
statute requires the State to prove both that a person has not committed a solicitation, 
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conspiracy, or attempt crime but has solicited, enticed, or lured a minor to engage in 
sexual activity or has attempted to do so. Because the plain language of this statute 
requires proof of both the existence and nonexistence of an inchoate offense, the statute is 
internally inconsistent. When competing provisions of a statute conflict in this manner, 
this court must invalidate the law and return it to the legislature for correction. Even were 
this Court to attempt to construe the legislature's intent in enacting competing provisions, 
the legislative history provides no guidance and it is impossible to determine the purpose 
behind the statute given its contradictory terms. 
The conflicting provisions of the Internet enticement statute also render it 
unconstitutionally vague. Although the statute states that the conduct cannot amount to 
an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation, it does not define what actions a person must take 
to violate the provision. Because reasonably intelligent persons cannot reconcile the 
terms of the statute, the statute fails to give adequate notice of prohibited conduct and it 
unfairly affords the police complete discretion to apply the statute. 
The flaws in the Internet enticement statute also made it impossible for the jury to 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented below failed to address Mr. 
Silvaz's knowledge and intent during the Internet chat. Given the conflicting provisions 
of the statute, no reasonable juror could convict Mr. Silvaz or find both the nonexistence 
of a solicitation crime and a solicitation at the same time. 
Finally, the prosecutor unfairly commented on the failure to call Mr. Silvaz's 
21 
online friends to support the defense. Before commenting on the failure to call witnesses, 
prosecutors must obtain advance authorization from the trial judge and show that the 
witnesses are peculiarly available to the defense. Here, the prosecutor never sought 
advance permission. Moreover, the uncalled witnesses were equally available to the 
State, and could have been identified through normal investigative procedures. The trial 
judge plainly erred in failing to strike the prosecutor's comments because they 
communicated to the jury that Mr. Silvaz was guilty because his failure to present his 
online friends' testimony showed that the friends could not support his defense. These 
comments also rendered a guilty verdict more likely because they directly attacked the 
central issue in this case: Mr. Silvaz's credibility. 
ARGUMENT 
Several grounds require the reversal of Mr. Silvaz's conviction for enticing a 
minor. First, because the Internet enticement statute is internally inconsistent and 
contradictory, this Court must return it to the legislature for clarification. Second, the 
statute is so flawed that it fails to give reasonable persons notice of prohibited criminal 
conduct. Third, given the contradictory terms of the statute, the jury could not have found 
Mr. Silvaz guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Fourth, the prosecutor's improper 
comments on Mr. Silvaz's failure to call his online friends to testify prejudiced the 
defense and influenced the jury to convict Mr. Silvaz. 
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I. THE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE 
INTERNET ENTICEMENT STATUTE REQUIRE 
REVERSAL OF THE ENTICEMENT CONVICTION AND 
LEGISLATIVE REDRAFTING 
When a statute is internally inconsistent, it deprives criminal defendants of notice 
of a crime. Here, the Internet enticement statute requires the State to prove that a person 
has not committed the crimes of attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation but then obligates the 
State to show that a person has used a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor 
or has attempted to do so. This crime, thus, requires the State to prove both the 
nonexistence and the existence of the same crime. Because that statute creates an 
impossible situation, it is "fatally flawed" and requires reversal. R. 212: 97-98. 
In drafting the Internet enticement statute, the legislature created "patently 
inconsistent" requirements. Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995). 
That statute requires the State to prove that no inchoate crimes occurred and then defines 
the offense in terms of an inchoate crime: 
A person commits enticement of a minor over the Internet when, 
not amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation under 
Section 76-4- 101,76-4-201, or 76-4-203, the person knowingly 
uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or attempt to 
solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a person the defendant 
believes to be a minor to engage in any sexual activity which is 
a violation of state criminal law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2002). 
The plain words of this statute create an irreconcilable contradiction. In 
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interpreting statutes, this Court must "seek to give effect to the intent of the legislature in 
light of the purpose the act was meant to achieve." Gutierrez v. Medley. 972 P.2d 913, 
915 (Utah 1998). In doing so, this court first looks "'to the plain language of the 
[statute]." Id This Court "need not look beyond the plain language of [the] provision 
unless [this Court] find[s] some ambiguity in it." In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 
1996). 
The plain language of the Internet enticement statute requires the State to prove 
that a person has used a computer to solicited a minor or attempted to do so but has not 
committed an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401 
(Supp. 2002). This statute is similar to the elections statute construed in Nelson in which 
the provision both gave county commissioners discretion to terminate an election under a 
citizens initiative but also required them to hold an election unless a majority of 
signatories on the initiative withdrew their support. 905 P.2d at 875-76 (construing 
former Utah Code Annotated section 10-2-102.8(2)). The Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
the plain language of the elections statute was clear but "patently inconsistent" and 
"contradictory." Id at 876. 
When a statute is plain but "internally inconsistent," this court must invalidate the 
statute and allow the legislature to correct the inconsistency. Id Reconciling the 
competing provisions of the Internet enticement statute would require this Court to 
"render certain viable parts meaningless and void." Id, "To choose which statement 
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controls over the whole would amount to legislation by judicial fiat." IdL Based on the 
separation of powers doctrine, "the power to remedy this inconsistency lies within the 
province of our legislature." Id Because the Internet enticement statute is plain but 
contradictory, this Court must return that statute to the legislature for correction. Id. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the statute was ambiguous, the legislative 
history provides no enlightenment as to the legislature's intent. When a statute is 
ambiguous, this Court may "seek guidance from the legislative history." Worthen. 926 
P.2d at 866. The legislature enacted the Internet enticement statute in 2001. See 2001 
Utah Laws, ch. 353, §1 (effective April 30, 2001). Although the legislature extensively 
revised the bill for that provision, the bill file contains no hint of the legislature's intent 
in enacting the bill into law. See Bill File, House Bill 181, 54th Utah Leg., 2001 Gen. 
Sess. at http://www.image.le.state.ut.us/imaging/bilLasp. Further, both houses of the 
legislature unanimously adopted the final draft of that bill without any debate on the 
measure. Floor Debate, 54th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (February 13, 2001) (House 
Recording no. 1, counter# 1946); Floor Debate, 54th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (February 21, 
2001) (Senate Recording 33, counter# 2460); Floor Debate, 54th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(February 27, 2001) (Senate Recording 43, counter# 1937). 
The contradictory terms of that statute also prevent this Court from discerning "the 
purpose the act was meant to achieve." Gutierrez. 972 P.2d at 915. The Internet 
enticement statute obviously seeks to protect minors from sex offenders who use the 
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Internet. But, when contradictory phrases require appellate courts to "choose which 
statement controls," appellate courts must defer to the legislature to correct a statute. 
Nelson, 905 P.2d at 876. Thus, even if this Court could identify the exact purpose behind 
the Internet enticement statute, this Court must allow the legislature to remedy the statute; 
otherwise, this Court would engage in "legislation by judicial fiat." IdL Because the plain 
language of that statute and the legislative history both lead to the same irreconcilable 
conclusion, this Court should invalidate the provision and reverse Mr. Silvaz's 
conviction. Id. 
n. THE INTERNET ENTICEMENT STATUTE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
The Internet enticement statute also violates the due process right to notice because 
its provisions are contradictory and vague. Requiring the State to prove both that no 
solicitation crime occurred but that a person has solicited a minor deprives an average 
citizen of notice of prohibited conduct. The statute fails to define what constitutes the 
criminal conduct listed in the statute. Because the contradictory provisions cannot be 
reconciled, reversal is required. 
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it: (1) fails to provide a "person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited;" (2) "impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
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and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application;" or (3) inhibits the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Gravned v. City 
ofRockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). As the Utah Supreme Court has ruled, ,K[a] 
criminal statute must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform persons of ordinary 
intelligence what their conduct must be to conform to its requirements and to advise one 
accused of violating it what constitutes the offense with which he is charged.5" State v. 
Blowers. 717 P.2d 1321, 1322 (Utah 1986) (quoting Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805, 807 
(Utah 1974)).2 
In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, this court presumes that statutes are 
valid and it resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. Provo City v. 
Thompson. 2002 UT App 63, [^10, 44 P.3d 828. However, criminal statutes must be 
especially clear to provide defendants sufficient notice of what conduct may lead to the 
deprivation of their personal liberty. "[NJothing is a crime which is not clearly and 
unmistakably made a crime." State v. Lambert. 514 So. 2d 550, 552 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
2Defense counsel preserved this issue by arguing that the Internet enticement 
statute was "fatally flawed" because it required the State to prove "both a solicitation and 
not a solicitation beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 212: 98. In any event, the trial judge 
plainly erred in allowing the State to prosecute Mr. Silvaz based on a vague, contradictory 
statute. The trial court plainly errs when "(i) an error was made; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, so that in the absence of 
the error, a more favorable outcome was reasonably likely." State v. Helmick. 2000 UT 
70, %99 9 P.3d 164. The Internet enticement statute satisfies these three requirements 
because it is obviously contradictory and is, therefore, vague. Moreover, because that 
statute is invalid, the State lacked authority to prosecute Mr. Silvaz under that provision. 
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Likewise, under the rule of lenity, any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be construed 
in the defendant's favor. State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The Internet enticement statute is vague because it fails to identify what conduct 
constitutes a crime. That statute clearly states that the crime cannot amount to an 
"attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation" but the purports to define a separate crime by 
barring persons from "soliciting], seduc[ing], lurfing], or entic[ing], or attempting] to 
solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor" to engage in unlawful sexual activity. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2002). The statute fails to explain any difference between an 
inchoate crime and the prohibited conduct. 
Moreover, the statute does not indicate what conduct constitutes an offense. For 
example, does a person violate the statute by simply communicating sexual message to a 
minor over the Internet or must the person take some concrete steps to carry out the 
solicited act? Because the statute provides no parameters for the prohibited conduct, it 
fails to give reasonable persons adequate notice of a crime. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. 
For the same reasons, the Internet enticement statute grants law enforcement 
officials "virtually unrestrained power . . . to arrest and charge persons with a violation." 
Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Under that statute, the 
police have enormous discretion to arrest Internet users who even appear to be engaging 
in sexual discussions with minors. Without more definite guidance from the legislature, 
the police have power to detain and arrest possibly innocent or joking communications. 
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This situation is similar to the ordinance at issue in City of Chicago v. Morales. 527 U.S. 
41, 60-61 (1999), that allowed the police to disperse groups who gathered for "'no 
apparent purpose.'" (Quoting ordinance). Because this phrase granted the police 
unfettered discretion to assess a person's motives for gathering, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. The Internet enticement statute suffers 
from the same defect by failing to specify what conduct constitutes a solicitation or an 
attempt to solicit a minor while not amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation 
crime. 
The Internet enticement statute is further vague because it is so "'conflicting and 
inconsistent in its provisions that it cannot be executed.'" Commonwealth v. Harbst 763 
A.2d 953, 957 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (quoting Pennsylvania Builders Association v. 
Dep't of Revenue. 552 A.2d 730, 737 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (internal citations 
omitted)). That statute criminalizes the very conduct that the statute explicitly states that 
the crime cannot constitute. This plain contradiction defeats any presumption of 
constitutionality because there is simply no way to reconcile the two conflicting 
requirements. 
The Internet enticement statute is similar to a Louisiana statute that criminalized 
the possession of "'apomorhine'" but exempted possession of "'isoquinoline alkaloids of 
opium.'" Lambert. 514 So. 2d at 552 (quoting former La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 40: 
967). Expert testimony established that apomorhine was an isoquinoline alkaloid of 
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opium. Id The Louisiana Court of Appeals ruled that these "contradictory" terms could 
not be reconciled. Id at 553. Thus, because the statute failed to clearly state a crime, no 
crime occurred. Id.; see People v Monroe. 515 N.E.2d 42, 44 (111. 1987) (statute that 
required one mens rea under the definition of a crime and a different mens rea under the 
punishment section for that crime "directly conflicted]"). 
The contradictory language of the Internet enticement statute violated Mr. Silvaz's 
right to due process because he lacked notice of what conduct constituted a crime. 
Accordingly, Mr. Silvaz requests this Court to reverse his conviction. 
HI. THE CONFLICTING LANGUAGE OF THE INTERNET 
ENTICEMENT STATUTE PREVENTED A 
REASONABLE JURY FROM FINDING GUILT BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT 
The language of the Internet enticement statute is so muddled that the State could 
not establish sufficient evidence of a crime. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 
this Court "view[s] the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict and assume[s] that the jury believed the evidence 
and inferences that support the verdict." State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993), 
overruled on other grounds in State v. Mirquet 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996). 
Reversal is required "when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable" that 
reasonable persons must have entertained a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. 
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State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). 
The marshaled evidence supporting the conviction included the transcript of the 
Internet chat in which E. J. stated that he was 13-years old. Mr. Silvaz also invited E. J. 
to meet him at a hotel to engage in sodomy. Mr. Silvaz then appeared at the hotel, waited 
several minutes, and looked for someone. He also had E. J.'s Internet user name and 
school address written on a piece of paper in his pocket. 
Despite these facts, the evidence does not address Mr. Silvaz's intent or knowledge 
when he made the communications. Given this lack of evidence and the convoluted 
terms of the Internet enticement statute, the jury had no means of deciding whether Mr. 
Silvaz had the requisite intent or knowledge to commit a crime. That statute required the 
State to prove "both a solicitation and not a solicitation beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 
212: 98. Under the plainly conflicting requirements of the statute, the jury would have 
had to find the existence and the nonexistence of a solicitation. There was no way for the 
jury to reasonably find the existence of competing facts as required under the statute. 
Given this impossibility, reversal is required. Goddard, 871 P.2d at 543. 
IV. THE PROSECUTOR TAINTED THE JURY'S VERDICT 
BY COMMENTING ON THE FAILURE TO CALL 
DEFENSE WITNESSES TO TESTIFY 
Reversal and a new trial are also required because the prosecutor improperly 
commented on Mr. Silvaz's failure to call his online friends to testify. Prosecutors may 
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only comment on the failure to call witnesses when witnesses are uniquely available to 
the defendant. Given the inference of guilt created by comments on the failure to call 
witnesses, prosecutors must seek an advance ruling from the trial court to make such 
comments. Here, the prosecutor neither sought an advance ruling nor were the witnesses 
peculiarly available to Mr. Silvaz. 
The prosecutor's comments on Mr. Silvaz's failure to present the testimony of his 
online friends unfairly and prejudicially biased the jury. Under the missing witness rule, 
"'if a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony 
would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it permits an inference that 
the testimony, if produced, would have been unfavorable.'" State v. Smith. 706 P. 2d 
1052, 1057 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 
1972)). The proponent of the inference has the burden of establishing that a witness is 
peculiarly within the power of the other party. Id at 1057-58. The proponent makes such 
a showing when "'the witness is physically available only to the opponent, or [] the 
witness has the type of relationship with the opposing party that pragmatically renders his 
testimony unavailable to the opposing party.'" Id at 1058 (quoting Chicago College of 
Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller. Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
But, given the risk of exposing the jury to highly prejudicial comments, parties seeking to 
comment on the failure to call witnesses must obtain ,Kan advance ruling from the trial 
court'" before making such arguments. State v. Thompson. 776 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1989) 
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(quoting Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). 
Here, the prosecutor never sought an advance ruling before arguing that Mr. Silvaz 
failed to call his online friends to testify. Rather, he argued that it was "convenient" for 
Mr. Silvaz not to call his online friends to testify because it allowed Mr. Silvaz to claim 
that he was only joking and that he was mistaken about E. J.'s age. The obvious 
implication of these arguments was that Mr. Silvaz was guilty because had he called his 
friends to testify they would not have supported his story. 
Had the prosecutor properly sought an advance ruling, the trial court could have 
realized that the State had equal access to the uncalled witnesses. Although Mr. Silvaz 
apparently knew the names of his online friends, the State could have obtained a search 
warrant and examined Mr. Silvaz's computer for records of his Internet communications. 
A subpoena to the Internet service provider could have also revealed the user names and 
identities of the persons using the chat room M4MUtah on the day in question. By 
employing these relatively simple means, the State had access to all persons that Mr. 
Silvaz communicated with over the Internet. Because the prosecutor never sought an 
advance ruling and given that the online friends were equally accessible to both parties, 
the prosecutor erred in commenting on Mr. Silvaz's failure to call witnesses. Thompson, 
776 P.2d at 50. 
Although defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's improper comments, 
the trial judge plainly erred in failing to exclude them. The trial court plainly errs when 
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"(i) an error was made, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) 
the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more favorable outcome was 
reasonably likely." State v. Helmick. 2000 UT 70,1f9, 9 P.3d 164. The Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that prosecutors may not comment on the failure to call defense witnesses 
in the absence of an advance ruling and when the State has equal access to the witnesses. 
Thompson. 776 P.2d at 50; Smith. 706 P.2d at 1057-58. Because the prosecutor's 
comments violated the missing witness rule and given that the law on this issue was 
"clear,,f Mr. Silvaz has satisfied the first two requirements of the plain error doctrine. 
State v. Garcia. 2001 Ut App 19, ^ [18, 18 P.3d 1123. 
The prosecutor's comments also irreparably harmed Mr. Silvaz's defense. When 
prosecutors improperly bring to jurors' attention the failure to call witnesses, reversal is 
required when the defendant shows that "'the jurors were probably influenced by the 
improper remarks in reaching their verdict.'" IdL (quoting State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 
400, 402 (Utah 1986)). In this case, the main issue below was Mr. Silvaz's intent and 
knowledge when communicating with E. J. Because Mr. Silvaz's testimony provided the 
bulk of the evidence to support his lack of criminal intent, his credibility was the key 
question for the jury. But, the prosecutor's improper comments on the failure to call 
witnesses directly attacked Mr. Silvaz's credibility and veracity. Those comments 
communicated to the jury that had Mr. Silvaz jokingly or unknowingly solicited sex with 
a 13-year old, the online friends would have testified in support of that defense. But, 
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because Mr. Silvaz never called them to the stand, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Silvaz 
must have been guilty. 
Because the prosecutor's improper comments destroyed Mr. Silvaz's credibility, 
the comments likely influenced the jury's guilty verdict. Thompson. 776 P.2d at 50. The 
only evidence establishing Mr. Silvaz's explanation was his own testimony supported by 
his credibility. Had the prosecutor not unfairly maligned Mr. Silvaz's story, the jury 
would have been free to believe Mr. Silvaz. The transcript of the Internet chat provides 
support for Mr. Silvaz's innocence. Specifically, when E. J. stated his age and asked for 
Mr. Silvaz's age, Mr. Silvaz responded, "Whatever" as if he did not take E. J. seriously. 
R. 212: 108; Exhibit B at 1. Mr. Silvaz also tried repeatedly to end the conversation by 
saying that he had to leave to get ready. 
Moreover, as trial counsel emphasized, the Internet provides a forum for speech 
that may not otherwise be communicated in person. R. 212: 18-19, 158. The relative 
anonymity of the Internet invites speech that pushes the limits of the First Amendment. 
Here, for example, Mr. Silvaz communicated with other gay men under circumstances 
where he felt safe in discussing homosexual matters and joking about them. Gay men 
likely have few other forums in which they enjoy such perceived security, especially 
when compared to face-to-face encounters. 
In direct contrast to these innocent explanations, the prosecutor's erroneous 
comments directly rebutted Mr. Silvaz's claims. Given the pivotal role that Mr. Silvaz's 
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credibility played below, the prosecutor's attack on Mr. Silvaz's credibility likely swayed 
the jury to convict him. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Silvaz requests this Court to invalidate the Internet enticement statute and to 
reverse his conviction under that provision. 
SUBMITTED this _£* day of August, 2002. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3. ASSAULT AGAINST POLICE OFFICER - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/29/2001 Guilty 
4. INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/29/2001 Guilty 
HEARING 
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SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ENTICING A MINOR OVER THE 
INTERNET a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ENTICING A MINOR OVER THE 
INTERNET a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 1 year(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ASSAULT AGAINST POLICE 
OFFICER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 1 year(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 1 
year(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST 
a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 6 
month(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 6 month(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COURT ORDERED DEFT COMMITTED TO 1 YEAR JAIL. COURT ORDERED DEFT TO 
REPORT TO COURTHOUSE ON 4/10/2002 AT 9:00 AM FOR TRANSPORT TO JAIL. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No Violations of the Law 
Follow all conditions set by agency. 
Maintain full time employment or full time student 
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO COMPLETE PSYCHO SEXUAL TREATMENT OR OTHER 
TREATMENT, AS AP&P DEEMS NECESSARY. 
COURT MAY CONSIDER AN EARLY RELEASE INTO A AN IN-PATIENT TREATMENT 
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PROGRAM. 
COURT ORDERED NO CONTACT WITH YOUNG CHILDREN THROUGH EMPLOYMENT AND 
RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES. 
COURT ORDERED SUBSTANCE ABUSE COUNSELING, IF AP&P DEEMS IT 
NECESSARY. 
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO CONTACT AP&P BEFORE REPORTING TO JAIL. 
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO COMPLY WITH ALL STANDARD PROBATION 
CONDITIONS. 
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO COMPLY WITH DR. FOX'S RECOMMENDED TREATMENT. 
Dated this J day of 
BHfrCE C'UBECK 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
leblue: H I G H 
cit: hey u 
eblue: H O W G O E S IT 
cit: good and u 
eblue: H O W OLD R YOU? 
ebiue: G R E A T T H A N K S 
jt: how old r u and why r u yelling at me 
eblue: N O T 
it: i am 13 from murray and will be 14 in July 
it: asl 
.blue: W H A T E V E R 
sblue: K 
*blue: T H A N K S 
it: so wsup 
sblue: J U S T H O R N Y 
it: lol 
;biue: B IG A N D ROCK HARD 
»blue: A N D Y O U ? 
it: yea kind of 
*iue: H O W BIG R Y O U 
t: 5'5 135 poundi brown hair and eyes u 
•blue: LQQK AT M Y PROFILE 
blue: Y O U H A V E A PIC 
t: only my year book ones and i got rid of themi look stupid 
blue: NO NEW ONES 
blue: WHOM DO YOU LIVE WITH? 
t: my mom 
blue: YOU NEAR DOWN TOWN 
t: who do u live with 
blue: B R O T H E R 
t: i live in murray where do u liv 
blue: R O Y 
t: kewl its just me and mom 
blue: H O W FAR IS M U R R Y 
t: roy is brother 
blue: N O I LIVE IN ROY WITH M Y BROTHER 
t: oh kewl where is roy 
blue: WHERE IS MURRY 
blue: ROYISBYOGDEN 
: kewl 
: do u know wher murray is 
blue: N O P E 
blue: W H E R E 
: its by salt lake 
: on the other side 
blue: H O W FAR 
blue: D O Y O U DRIVE 
blue: HELLO 
: i cant get my licenc until i turn 16 
: i walk every where 
due: H O W FAR IS M U R R Y FROM D O W N TOWN SLC 
: maybe 15 minutes if u drive a lot longet if u walk 
„ u e : WELL I WILL BE IN SLC T O NIGHT? 
izkit: kewl where at 
nneblue: IF Y O U W A N T T O M E E T M E 
nneblue: B Y S H I L O 
izkit: that would be kewl what will we do 
nneblue: F U N 
nneblue: SEX 
nneblue: AND ALL 
nneblue: DO YOU DRINK 
izkit: kewl 
nneblue: OR SMOKE 
izkit: i drink 
nneblue: Y O U D O Y O U S M O K E B U D 
izkit: a couple of times 
nneblue: I H A V E S O M E 
nneblue: D O Y O U VVANA M E E T 
izkit: yeah that would be kewl 
izkit: what should we do 
nneblue: WHAT IS YOUR NUMBER SO I CALL YOU WHEN I GET THERE 
izkit: ah my mom is home she will kill me if u call 
nneblue: M E A N T H O N Y 
nneblue: S O H O W R W E G O I N G T O M E E T 
izkit: im ej do u know where my school is it is riverview jr high 
nneblue: N E A R W H E R E 
izkit: im in the 8th grade 
nneblue: T H A T S F INE 
nneblue: WILL YOU BE ABLE TO CUM OUT 
izkit: kewl i live by my school and riverview jr high is on 7thwest and 5900 south in murray 
izkit: sounds fun what do u want to do 
nneblue: DRINK 
nneblue: A N D S U C K E A C H O T H E R 
izkit: kewl sounds fun 
izkit: r u sure u will meet me or be a shine 
nneblue: W H A T IS Y O U R N A M E 
nneblue: I W A N T T O M E E T Y O U 
izkit: ej 
nneblue: H O W BIG R Y O U R F E E T 
izkit: 8 
nneblue: NICE 
nneblue: A N D Y O U R C O C K 
izkit: my nikes r 
izkit: i dont no 
lizkit: kinda of big i guess r u 
nneblue: IS IT BIG S M A L L ? 
nneblue: 7.5 
lizkit: in the middle i guess 
.nneblue: NICE 
.nneblue: Y O U LIKE T O S U C K 
>izkit: like ur dick 
mneblue: Y U r 
mneblue: D O Y O U 
jizkit: yeah do u , „ . 
.nneblue: C O O L *<> — « « 0 
leblue: WHAT ELSE 
kit: ive done some stuff 
kit: what do u want to do 
.eblue: L IKE W H A T 
.eblue: S U C K A N D FUCK 
,eblue: Y O U L IKE T O FUCK 
<it: yeah 
dt: do U 
eblue: YUP 
eblue: HOW ABOUT DO YOU FUCK ASS 
ut: once do u 
eblue: YUP 
eblue: AND I LIKE TO GET FUCKED TOO 
;it: kewl 
lit: u seem cute 
ebiue: D O Y O U L IKE THAT 
eblue: T H A N K S 
eblue: S O D O Y O U 
ebiue: W E L L I G O T T O GET R E A D Y 
eblue: CALL ME 
it: kewl when should we meet and where we can at my school 
it: or the gas station by it 
sblue: K 
ablue: 725-2455 
.blue: IS M Y C E L L 
it: kewl who do i ask for 
,biue: S O C A L L M E AFTER 8:30 
.blue: A N T H O N Y 
it: kewl call after 830 
.blue: K 
*biue: HOW FAR FROM SHILO DO YOU LIVE 
it: r u for real i dont want to get ready 
it: and have u not show 
*biue: IM FOR REAL AND I WILL SHOW 
*biue: IM ASKING HOW FAR FROM SHILO DO YOU LIVE 
•t: where should we meet at the gas station by my school riverview jr high 




Bbiue: H O W FAR DO YOU LIVE F R O M THERE 
it: murray is about a 15 drivehey u 
it: from salt lake city 
ebiue: SO YOU NOT NEAR DOWN TOWN 
ebiue: I NEVER BEEN TO MURRY 
it:
 ?*£! IZH!st about 15 minutes js all it: is thai a problem 
jt: if u meet early then i could maybe take trax downtown 
eblue: ft 
eblue: KEWL 
THAT IS G R E A T 
. * « . : AND W E WILL RENT A R O O M 
EJBizkit: k i will call and we wil meet should i take trax now 
down town o r when 
Monneblue: IT HAS RED LIGHTS 
Monneblue: I WILL BE LEAVING AT 8:30 
EJBizkit: when should i be there 
Monneblue: BE THERE AT 940 
EJBizkit: k at the shilo 
Monneblue: YES 
Monneblue: TAKE MY NUMBER 
55^EJBizkit: u want me there at the shilo in its a hotel by the salt 
ppace right 
EJBizkit: k give it to me again 
Monneblue: I WILL HAVE MY PHONE 
Monneblue: YUP 
Monneblue: 725-2455 
EJBizkit: kewl what do yen look like 
Monneblue: GOT TO GO 
EJBizkit: so i know who u r and stuff 
Monneblue: SEE MY PRO FILE 
EJBizkit: k so ur for real it's a long way ofr me to go if ymt 
shine ^ 
Monneblue: AND I WILL HAVE A BLACK JAKET 
Monneblue: I WILL BE THERE 
Monneblue: I PROMISE 
EJBizkit: kewl 
14 
kit: i think it is 
iebiue: AND WE WILL HAVE FUN 
.ebiue: GOT TO GET READY K 
<it: kewl i have to be home by 11 because it is a school night 
eblue: K 
,ebiue: IF YOU NEED MONEY I WILL GIVE YOU SOME 
eblue: K 
cit: so what should we do meet at my school or somewhere else 
cit: hey u 
ebiue: MEET DOWN TOWN 
ebiue: I DONT KNOW WHERE MURRY IS 
cit: kewl i can take trax downtown 
ebiue: I GOT TO GET READY 
eblue: K 
t^: where should we meet 
ebiue: M A K E S U R E T O T A K E M Y N U M B E R 
eblue: SHILO 
eblue: K 
ebiue: I GOT TO GET READY 
;it: where is the shilo 
Bbiue: BY THE SALT PALACE 
it: k i will call and we wil meet should I take trax now down town o r when 
Bbiue: IT HAS RED LIGHTS 
Bbiue: I WILL BE LEAVING AT 8:30 
it: when should i be there 
8biue: BE THERE AT 940 
it: k at the shilo 
jblue: Y E S 
*biue: TAKE MY NUMBER 
it: u want me there at the shilo in its a hotel by the salt place right 
it: k give it to me again 
}biue: I WILL HAVE MY PHONE 
sblue: Y U P 
jbiue: 725-2455 
it: kewl what do u look like 
»blue: GOT TO GO 
it: so i know who u r and stuff 
jbiue: S E E M Y P R O F ILE 
it: k so ur for real its a long way ofr me to go if u shine 
Bbiue: AND I WILL HAVE A BLACK JAKET 
Bbiue: I WILL BE THERE 
sblue: I PROMISE 
it: kewl 
it: me to it will be fun 
Bbiue: BE WEARING BLUE JEANS it: i will cal first 
Bbiue: AND BLACK SHIRT 
Bbiue: AND BLACK JACKET 
it: j srw*J**ar blue jeans or u will be 
eblue: K 
.it: S O * * »'v. -./i»*MNJ 
BUue-. »£BYE 
e- LEAVING TO GET READY 
" b X : "i will call when i get down town so be there k 
i Z £ K REMEMBER BE THER AT 940 
Monneblue: B l 
Ejbizkit: kcya there 
Monneblue: r ) 
